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On Relational Injustice: Could Colonialism Have Been Wrong Even if it Had Introduced More Benefits than Harms?

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ABSTRACT

A certain objection to the view that colonialism is and was morally problematic is that it has introduced more benefits than harms to the populations that have undergone it. This article sets aside the empirical question - that is, of interrogating whether colonialism did bring more benefits than harms; instead, it argues that historical instances of colonialism were wrong even if they had in fact brought net-positive aggregate consequences to the colonised populations. In arguing this, I develop and substantiate a new concept of relational injustice in describing the unique nature of inegalitarian, subjugative relationship defining the interaction between perpetrators and victims in colonialism. Given that moral relations cannot be reduced into the welfare of their respective individual agents, it is hence the case that incidental, unintended gains in individual welfare neither adequately compensate for nor at all rectify the initial relational injustice. There are three objections that are discussed and rejected, such as: i) the purported irrationality in individuals regretting events that left them better-off on aggregate, ii) individuals can opt to waive being in just and equal relations with others in exchange for individual gains, and iii) the advanced account is self-defeating, because it nullifies the possibility for adequate compensation.
INTRODUCTION

Recent debates over the legacy of colonialism—such as that of the British Empire—have often been centered around whether members of colonies have, on balance, benefited from being subject to colonial rule. Such debates are not only epistemically challenging, since they require speculation about how things would have turned out in the absence of colonialism; they also neglect the possibility that colonial projects could have been wrong independent of the harms they bring.

My thesis is that the relational injustice perpetuated under colonialism enacted unoffset wrongs, such that colonialism was wrong even in cases where it introduced counterfactual-comparative benefits. I will first discuss my concept of relational injustice, prior to establishing the empirical premise and explaining why such wrongs are unoffset by consequentialist gains.

Harm is often employed in a counterfactual-comparative manner: A’s treatment of B harms B if and only if B has lower welfare in the world in which that treatment occurs than in the closest possible world without that treatment. I propose, however, that B can be wronged by A’s treatment even when no such counterfactual-comparative harm occurs. On the understanding of wrongdoing that I adopt, A’s treatment of B wrongs B if and only if B is justified in holding resentful reactive attitudes towards A in relation to that treatment (Strawson, 1974). I say that there is unoffset wrongness in A’s treatment of B when it is reasonable for B to hold negative reactive attitudes towards A in relation to A’s treatment of B even though this treatment did not harm B in the counterfactual-comparative sense; B is not worse off—and may in fact be better off—with the treatment than in the closest possible world without it.

I hereby propose a new concept of ‘relational injustice’, which refers to the specific injustice perpetuated when an individual is placed in an unjustifiably lower status in relation to another within a relationship. Anderson (1999) discusses the concept of relational inequality, which involves status disparities that prevent individuals from relating to each other as equals within communities. Relational injustice is a particular form of inequality, which involves two additional features: i)
a group characteristic-based form of prejudice towards particular demographic groups that is ii) institutionalised through formal structures, such as government or the civil service. At its very core, relational injustice measures the quality of relationships between individuals. Relational injustice differs from distributive injustice, in that its manifestations—biases, psychological exclusion, and imposed deprecation of status—cannot be rectified even in a society where individuals have equal levels of welfare, or access to welfare.

**EMPIRICAL PREMISE**

Consider now the specific empirical premise, that colonialism did involve a violation of relational equality, and thus constitutes empirically an event of relational injustice. The significance of this section is as follows: if it can be established that relational injustice has been committed under colonialism, then it follows that colonial projects can be wrongful even if not harmful. Whilst African slavery had existed prior to European colonisation, the process of Western colonisation was embedded within large-scale Transatlantic Slavery that led to the non-consensual and dehumanising transfer of 11 million Africans to the Caribbean and Americas (King, 2010, pg.24). Colonies were governed by structures beholden (by definition) to either their original sovereign state (e.g. the UK, Spain, or France), or a newly emerged substitute (e.g. the US, Rhodesia); the colonised public in these areas were systematically ascribed a lower status than a select group of elites (Belich, 2009, p. 573). Moreover, indigenous populations faced psychological exploitation (from being forced to internalise racialised and deeply bigoted tropes about themselves, to navigating coerced family breakups and emotional torment and humiliation at hands of violent invaders) and social exclusion from elites who entrenched foreign interests and designated them the effective ‘Other’ in governance (Fanon, 1961). The apparent caveat is that not all colonial projects exemplified these phenomena equally, if at all; yet to the extent that they did, they were relationally unjust.

1. Taken here to be denoting a negative or discriminatory judgment with harmful effects; for more on this, see Fricker (2007).
RELATIONAL INJUSTICE AND WRONGNESS

Why is relational injustice typically wrongful? My view is that there is something intrinsically valuable in equal relations between persons within a particular society. Suppose we remove all specifications of characteristics and features about individuals within a hypothetical society, and are asked to choose between a world where all relations are deeply egalitarian and grounded upon mutual respect and compassion, and a world where all relations are inegalitarian, with a clearly arranged status order and hierarchy. Now suppose that both societies have achieved the same, optimal state from the point of view of distributive justice. We would intuitively find the former more appealing. I suggest that this is because relational equality is good in itself. A critic would rightly observe that our intuitions here are underdetermining—it is not clear if we find the unequal world less appealing because of the impersonal value we find in relational equality, or because of the wrongfulness in unequal relations. I suggest that we need not pick either of them—we could find the unequal world less appealing due to both impersonal value-centric and wrongfulness-centric considerations.

So why does such injustice wrong a particular individual, independent of specific impacts on their individual welfare? Could an individual be wronged in such a way that cannot be reduced to a loss of welfare? A potential justification is to view relational equality as the component of a universal claim-right held by all people—all individuals are entitled to being treated equally in their relations, independent of the outcomes associated with such treatment. The placement of an individual within a network of relations that treats them as if they were unequal violates their fundamental claim to being treated as a moral and social equal, given their possession of the prerequisite conditions that render them morally respectable agents: the ability to reason and (self)-consciousness. For more on this argument, see Jonathan Wolff (1998).

This proposition appears to also ground our common intuitions concerning why discrimination along arbitrary lines—even if it does not harm the individual—is intrinsically wrongful.

The potential challenge to my claim flagged above is that we find discrimination to be impersonally bad, as opposed to intrinsically wrongful for any particular individuals—i.e. it is a bad state of affairs irrespective of (and indeed, independent of) whether any individual’s welfare is set back by discrimination. We may find this notion attractive, in that it retains both the intuitive observation that the individuals
were indeed better off under discrimination, whilst also allowing us to condemn such discrimination.

Yet I find this rejoinder puzzling. We rarely appeal to the notion of ‘impersonal bad’ when explaining why the existence of discrimination is undesirable; instead, we intuit that there is something person-specific about the wrongness at stake—it is a particular individual who is being discriminated against, and thus our intuitive uneasiness stems from the individual’s experience and treatment, as opposed to a mysterious impersonal property. Whilst discrimination does not necessarily constitute an instance of relational injustice, both discrimination and relational injustice share the same ‘wrong-making’ feature—that is, the failure to treat individuals as moral or social equals, in the absence of normatively valid explanations.

The onus lies in establishing why the wrongfulness involved in relational injustice cannot be offset by aggregate welfare gains accrued to individuals. Consider the following example, which is similar to the one discussed by Woodward (1986): the Discriminated Homeless Person. A homeless individual is denied entry into a homeless shelter from the freezing weather outside, by an explicitly racist manager of the shelter; the shelter later collapses, killing everyone inside. From a counterfactual-comparative point of view, it appears that the homeless individual, whilst suffering from hypothermia, was indeed made better off by the initial denial of entry (which prevented their death). However, there remains an intuition that the homeless person has suffered relational injustice at the hands of a formal structure (the shelter) on the basis of some group characteristic (their ethnicity). In other words, they are wronged without being net-harmed on balance.

There are two primary strands of arguments in favour of the view that the wrongs (in both cases of colonialism and the Homeless), are not cancellable by offsetting welfare gains. Firstly, there is the argument from non-fungibility: every relation maps onto a correlation between two individuals—e.g. the coloniser and the colonised, the shelter manager and the homeless. Whilst redistribution of money, goods, or opportunities might have compensated the colonised’s individual welfare, it did not rectify the imbalances that had previously persisted (and continued to persist) in spite of the economic advances and technological innovation introduced under co-

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2. Assuming, of course, that their existence is utility-positive.
lonial rule. We intrinsically feel that there are certain items that money cannot buy (See Sandel, 2012)—for instance, relational attributes such as genuine love, compassion, or dignity and respect by other individuals. These are dimensions that exist independently of material benefits or individual welfare, in that they necessarily involve interactions between two or more individuals (e.g. it is unintelligible to discuss acquiring love without another person to love you). Therefore, assuming that such improvements to welfare did not (as per empirics) improve the relational parity between the colonised and colonisers, mere material improvements do not suffice in compensating for the previous wrongs.

Secondly, there is the argument from intentions. Many of colonial states’ greatest advances were unintended side benefits of projects primarily installed to generate revenue for the purpose of the colonisers. As such, material gains to the colonised were often the result of fortune and unintentionally favourable policies; even if this were not the case—as per certain colonies that acquired special economic status, such as Hong Kong and Singapore—the primary end objective of beneficiary economic policies remained ultimately the entrenchment of the colonisers’ interests. Consider the Saviour Burglar: a burglar breaks into a house with a malfunctioning microwave, and wakes up the sleeping houseowner in the process; the burglar steals $1,000 from the owner, but effectively saves the resident as they would have perished had the microwave later exploded. Now consider the Selfish Coach: the coach of a prodigy athlete views their success as the only means to accumulate substantial wealth and fame. As such, they sustain a relationally unequal relationship that nonetheless succeeds in training the athlete into becoming highly successful. The athlete would not have been as famous or well off had it not been for the unequal relations between them and their coach. In the case of the Selfish Coach, the benefits to the victim were accrued as a side benefit; in the case of the Saviour Burglar, the benefits were accidental and unintended. This is important, for whilst these benefits accrue to the victims in both cases above, in neither of the cases are they relevant to the particular relation between the individuals—the coach and the student, the burglar and the homeowner: the student’s success derives from their interaction with and recognition by external sporting organisations and other competitors; the counterfactual harm that the burglar ‘helps’ the homeowner avoid is originally caused by the homeowner’s mi-

3. Even for ‘successful’ colonies such as Hong Kong and Singapore, the public continued to reside under governance systems that were led and controlled predominantly by British civil servants; in British colonies in West and South Africa, many economic and social privileges were restricted solely to white residents.
crowave malfunctioning, as opposed to the burglar. The absence of active intentions to compensate renders the comparative benefits accidental, as opposed to being morally relevant and legitimate as a form of compensation. In both cases, we feel that the coach and the burglar have wronged the athlete and homeowner—in spite of the net benefits their actions brought.

Note here that I am not making the strong claim that relational injustice can never be commensurable with any forms of compensation (although this strong claim does sit well with some of our intuitions concerning the irreparability or non-compensatability of certain relation-specific goods—e.g. a particular romantic relationship, or a unique friendship between two friends); instead, I am merely making the claim that in the context of colonialism, the wrongs of colonialism have not been offset by the accidental and non-commensurate benefits that colonialism has brought.

Wertheimer (2008) discusses a distinction between harmful exploitation and mutually advantageous exploitation—the former denotes instances where exploitation is clearly harmful for the exploitee; whereas with the latter, he refers to instances where exploitation is uniquely Pareto Superior, that it allegedly leaves all parties—including both exploitees and exploiters—better off. Imagine a modified version of the Homeless case, where the manager survives the crash and receives a one-off payment that rewards him for his discriminatory behaviour, whereas the discriminated homeless man is (evidently) better off, having survived the crash by not being in the shelter.

My account offers critics of mutually advantageous exploitation with the necessary explanatory currency to explain why the homeless person is still wronged—the inherently unacceptable nature of how the homeless person is treated relationally is non-fungible with incidental material gains, and, perhaps more pertinently in this case, there exists no intention on behalf of the manager to rescue the homeless person, which suggests that it would be unreasonably generous to the manager to credit to him the incidental benefits the homeless person receives.

**OBJECTION I: EXCEPTIONAL CONDITIONS**

A primary objection to the above is the view that it is reasonable and rational for individuals to want to opt to waive relational equality in exchange for greater material benefits in certain cases. For instance, I may consent to selling myself into being a servant or junior assistant to someone (lower status within a relationship) in exchange for large volumes of money; alternatively, I may accept being sexualised...
under oppressive patriarchal norms in exchange for financial security. These scenarios present apparent cases where, if there exists sufficient payoff, relational injustice is arguably not wrongful.

More specifically, this objection could take two forms: i) exception by consent—where, if I consent voluntarily and autonomously to accepting relational injustice under some circumstances C₁, such injustice no longer wrongs me; ii) exception by rationality—where, if it is rational for me to accept relational injustice under some circumstances C₂, such injustice no longer wrongs me. Applying i) to the question at hand, it could be reasoned that colonised individuals might not have been wronged if they had consented voluntarily and autonomously to their relational injustice; ii) would imply that if it had been rational for the colonised to accept their injustice in exchange for the greater material benefits, they would not have been wronged by the injustice.

Neither version of the objection is fully successful. Notwithstanding such, whilst i) is empirically erroneous, ii), it must be conceded, is partially valid, but with some notable caveats.

In response to i), note that valid consent from the colonised—even if in exchange for material benefits—was largely lacking across most, if not all, colonial projects. Movements ranging from Gandhi’s non-violence to Ho Chi Minh’s pro-independence struggle; or even large-scale protests that pre-dated independence in Ghana, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and the Caribbean, were indicative of substantial popular discontent in spite of the arguably greater (and unique) socioeconomic benefits the colonial regimes had brought the colonies (Belich, 2009). Moreover, individuals often were not given the opportunity to choose whether they accepted the related benefits—there were minimal options that would permit easy international migration, let alone inter-regional movements for individuals to ‘opt out’ of the provided benefits. Additionally, the colonised often lacked economic, cultural, and political capital to influence politics and determine the arrangements and shape of the ‘beneficial cooperative schemes’ into which they were entered against their will: merely because they ostensibly accepted and ‘enjoyed’ the fruits of colonialism did not imply that they authentically consented to them. Whilst the reasons supplied here may neither be universally nor necessarily true, they are sufficient in illustrating that the consent-based objection raised above is at best severely limited in its explanatory power.

4. For more arguments that are similar to this, cf. common objections to tactic consent arguments in political theory — e.g. Simmons.
A more promising line may be ii), i.e. that it would have been rational for the colonised to accept the relational injustice brought about by colonialism, in exchange for the allegedly substantial material benefits. This version of the objection appears attractive, for it appears tentatively counterintuitive to posit that one could be wronged by an act that one would be maximally rational (most reasonable) in accepting and not rejecting.

Yet this objection is vulnerable to the fact that it fails to block the particular intuitions we feel in response to the Selfish Coach, the Saviour Burglar, and the Discriminated Homeless Person. For instance, it appears to be (most) rational for the discriminated homeless person to accept the racist treatment they experience, in exchange for not dying (and potentially incurring substantially greater welfare losses on the whole); yet this mere fact does not diminish the powerful intuition that there is something wrong about the relation of discrimination to which the homeless person is exposed. Merely because an outcome is most rationally desirable does not imply that it does not involve a wrongdoing.

The underlying explanation for the particularity of the above intuitions consists of the locality of relational injustice (cf. the above discussion concerning its non-fungibility)—even if it is holistically rational for an agent to accept the occurrence of the wrongdoing with their own welfare in mind, the rationality does not mitigate or resolve the particular relation between the wrongdoer and the wronged, which stands independently of the wronged’s individual welfare. In other words, the wrongness of relational injustice is local to the relation, as opposed to being a global property relevant to the individual’s welfare.

**OBJECTION II: POSSIBILITY OF COMPENSATION?**

The second objection to my central thesis is as follows: as it stands, it appears that the relational injustice account precludes the possibility of any future compensation. If we are to accept that relational injustices are spatiotemporally sensitive and ‘non-fungible’ with a wide range of material benefits, it appears that such relational injustices may never be offsettable by realistic practical options that wrongdoers may pursue in compensation. Should this be the case, this notion of wrongdoing appears to inherently render any form of targeted compensation futile. Whilst this by no
means undermines its internal support and consistency, an account of wrongdoing that does not allow for compensation seems to have limited practical value.

The first counter is meta-theoretical—merely because a theory does not serve to account for a particular type of action that may allegedly follow from it (e.g. compensation) does not undermine the explanatory, interpretive, and analytical virtue of such a theory.

The second counter is a concession—it is indeed possible for an individual to ‘accept’ material benefits in offsetting past wrongdoings involving relational injustice, but this concession at most grants that the wrongdoing can be fully mitigated through subsequent redress, but not offset automatically by the generation of any material benefits. In order for the compensation to not be vacuous, some initial, unoffset wrongs must have been committed—it is not the onus of this theory to defend the claim that it is never possible to compensate for past relational injustices, but merely that it requires a substantially high threshold in order to do so. Whilst it is beyond the scope to discuss the following in detail, I would suggest that an adequate theory pertaining to acceptable compensation for relational injustice must involve: i) relational equalisation—the formation of a relationship that constitutes parity and no power asymmetries; ii) acceptance—both parties must view the compensation (in whatever form it may take) as a genuine and adequate compensation pertaining to the relational injustice, and iii) appropriate intentions—the wrongdoer must possess appropriate intentions that reflect genuine desire to compensate: for example, the racist shelter manager cannot pay the homeless with the primary (ulterior) motive of preventing an ignominious expose: the compensatory move must be accompanied by genuinely apologetic intentions.6

OBJECTION III: THE QUASI-PARFITIAN REGRETS TEST

A further objection is quasi-Parfitian7: it reasons that it would be erroneous to hold that a person is wronged by an injustice if the person would not have been better off in comparison, even had the injustice not occurred. More specifically, assuming that when we posit that something is wrong we are also making the claim

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6. These conditions appear to be rather demanding; one may correctly ponder if they must also obtain as general conditions for compensation for past wrongs across all cases. One potential reason why they apply particularly strongly to the context of relational injustice is the unique role played by authentic intentions and relational parity within the discursive sphere of relational equality.

that something is regrettable, to regret something that is comparatively better for one appears to be unintelligible. Note here that the metaphysical assumption is that in the absence of relational inequality afflicting them, colonised individuals would not have acquired the material gains and welfare improvements, either because they would not have existed in the first place, or because the outcomes very well could have been worse. As such, it would be unreasonable for the colonised to regret colonialism, without also regretting the comparative benefits they derived from the process.

Note the distinction between harm (a comparative concept) and wrong (a non-comparative concept). This objection assumes that the relevant metric is reasonable regrettablility, but neglects whether regrettablility maps onto the concept of harm, or wrong. I suggest that it maps onto only the former—for we may find something wrong without wishing that it had not happened. The homeowner and athlete may find the burglar and their coach having wronged them, whilst simultaneously being content with the burglary and training they received. Furthermore, it is also deeply unclear as to why individuals cannot regret particular events, even if they do introduce (incidental) net benefits to them—for instance, a person who wins a lottery after undergoing an agonising surgery may have derived more benefit on the whole, but may still (retrospectively) wish that the surgery had not occurred, because the pain accrued from the surgery is non-commensurate with the 10,000GBP they subsequently win.

Most fundamentally, Parfit’s regrets test could be turned upon the argument—perhaps it is the (non-necessary) entailment between the wrong-making feature (e.g. the break-in, the harsh training, and the relational injustice under colonialism) and the welfare improvements that is most reasonable to regret: after all, it is not inconceivable for there to be a possible world where individuals’ welfare is benefited without the preceding acts of relational injustice. A possible world where the entailment between the two does not obtain is one that is not only clearly conceivable, but also potentially relatively proximate to this world. The upshot is that the colonised can regret the relational inequality they experience without regretting the benefits they accrue ‘as a result’ of the relational inequality.

In conclusion, the concept of relational injustice offers a useful avenue to accounting for the wrongness of empires independent of counterfactual-based disputes.

8. cf. the ‘fragility’ assumption underpinning most versions of the Non-Identity Problem —i.e. a slight change in events could result in substantial changes to future events, which produce individuals with completely distinct de re identities.

9. Let us not diverge into the interesting but ultimately orthogonal discussion of how causation ought to be interpreted.
over colonialism’s impact on individual welfare. Even if colonies had become more prosperous under colonisation, this offers no recuse for the errors of empires past.

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The Paradox of the Benefiting Samaritan

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ABSTRACT

Many persons believe that benefiting from injustice can be morally wrong. Philosophers have developed several compelling theories to justify this intuition. These theories, however, may have a difficult time explaining a particular set of benefit-from-injustice cases: cases in which the beneficiary subjectively opposes the injustice from which she objectively benefits. This paper suggests that our moral duties to disgorge the benefits of injustice may vary in proportion to our subjective intent in acquiring and using those benefits. In doing so, it reasons by analogy to other areas of moral and legal theory, including principles of compensation for unjust harms.

In the 2005 film Thank You for Smoking, smooth-talking tobacco company spokesman Nick Naylor (Aaron Eckhart) is charged with publicly defending the interests of Big Tobacco. Naylor is invited to a panel discussion on live TV, where he faces an unfriendly studio audience; Robin Williger, a 15-year-old cancer patient who has recently quit smoking; and anti-smoking crusader Ron Goode, who works for an organization dedicated to fighting tobacco consumption. Naylor boldly goes on the attack against Goode, accusing him and his organization of benefiting from the well-publicized deaths of lung cancer patients:

Naylor: The Ron Goodes of this world want the Robin Willigers to die.

Goode: What?
Many people have the strong intuition that benefiting from injustice is wrong. These persons should be troubled by the type of case Naylor outlines in Thank You for Smoking. Let us call this problem the

Paradox of the Benefiting Samaritan: The greatest beneficiaries of injustice are sometimes those persons most opposed to it.

Here are two examples of the paradox:

News Media: A president is elected who has many unjust aims, some of which he immediately achieves. The media organizations who oppose him most stridently attract the greatest number of new readers and viewers, and their advertising revenues increase dramatically. Had any other president been elected, their revenues would have been significantly lower.²

Patriotic Film: A film director plans to release a patriotic film about a group of terrorists who are hunted down by heroic special operations forces. Shortly before the film is released, a real terrorist attack occurs, killing many people. The public is enraged by the attack, and many more filmgoers attend the director’s film than would have had the real attack not occurred. The director becomes very wealthy.

The normative theories of benefiting from injustice currently in circulation may find it challenging to explain the Paradox of the Benefiting Samaritan. In this paper, I briefly consider as a solution, and then reject, the three most plausible existing theories—the first and second for permitting too many benefits from injustice, and the third for permitting too few. I then advance a new type of theory—the use theory of benefit from injustice, which relies on the doctrine of double effect (DDE)—which I hope can help solve the paradox. By “solving the paradox,” I mean satisfactorily explaining the intuition that Goode, the news media, and the film director are morally entitled to retain their benefits, but without abandoning the idea that benefiting from injustice—especially deliberately—can be wrong.


2. This phenomenon arguably occurs on both sides of the political aisle. See, e.g., Dan Frommer, “Donald Trump helped the New York Times add its most digital subscribers since 2011”; see also David Folkenflik, “Fox News Thrives In The Age Of Obama.”
A PRELIMINARY QUESTION: WHAT DOES “FROM” MEAN?

Before beginning the search for a solution to the Paradox, however, it is important to note a basic conceptual problem—one which affects all theories of benefit from injustice. That is the difficult question of what it means for a benefit to flow “from” an injustice. What is the type of causation required for a benefit to be of this type? Here are two possibilities:

1. **But-for causation.** But for injustice I, agent A would not now have benefit B.

2. **Proximate causation.** Injustice I is the closest or most immediate cause of agent A’s possession of benefit B.

But-for causation may seem too broad to accurately explain what a benefit from injustice is. Consider

*Lucky Number Seven*: An armed robbery delays the Number 7 subway line that Jenny takes to work every day. As a result, she has fifteen minutes of spare time on her hands. She decides to use that time to buy a lottery ticket. Jenny wins a million dollars.

But for the armed robbery on the 7 line, Jenny would not now have a million dollars. In fact, had the robbery occurred even a minute earlier or later, she would have bought a different ticket, and someone else would have won instead. Are her lottery winnings a benefit from injustice? It seems a stretch to characterize her winnings in that way.

Proximate causation may seem too narrow, however. Consider

*Left Turn*: While fleeing from the police three weeks ago, the same armed robber accidentally dropped the proceeds of his robbery in an abandoned lot. During that three-week time span, Robert, who lives a few blocks away from the lot, has under-
gone a series of dramatic life changes: he was fired from his job, started a part-time art degree, and eventually moved apartments. As a result, instead of taking his usual right turn past the lot, he takes a left and comes upon the robbery proceeds.

Despite the fact that the proximate cause of Robert’s gain was arguably the last link in the chain of events leading to Robert’s finding of the stolen property, it does not seem unreasonable to characterize his findings as a benefit from injustice—especially if he knows the goods were stolen.

Questions of what it means for a benefit to flow “from” injustice will affect any theory purporting to answer the Paradox of the Benefiting Samaritan. I ask the reader, however, to bracket these concerns for now, and to await a better examination of them in a different paper. Whatever the right answer to this question may be, there will be some cases which clearly count as a benefit from injustice and some which do not. In this paper, I hope to provide cases of fairly obvious benefits from injustice. If I fail to do so, the reader is invited to imagine her own cases in their place.

CURRENT THEORIES I: THE BENEFICIARY PAYS PRINCIPLE

The conceptual ambiguity above notwithstanding, philosophers have advanced several justifications for the claim that beneficiaries of wrongdoing ought to relinquish or transfer their benefits to others. The first of these justifications is the beneficiary pays principle (BPP).

The BPP holds, roughly speaking, that those who have benefited from a wrong may be obligated to help pay for the harms of the wrong. It has legal parallels in the law of unjust enrichment. Most recently, the BPP has been advanced as a candidate principle for obligating the citizens of wealthy countries, most if not all of whom have benefited from the economic growth enabled by historical carbon emissions, to pay for the harmful effects of climate change.

The foremost proponent of the BPP is Daniel Butt. Butt’s polychrestos plant case offers a clear illustration of the type of situation which he thinks can trigger the BPP:

Four people, A, B, C and D live on a remote island; each one possessing one quarter

4. See, for example, Daniel Butt, “On Benefiting from Injustice.”
of the land. All four are entirely self-sufficient, and their landholdings are separated by high fences. There is little or no contact between the four. The only crop which will grow on the island is the extremely versatile Polychrestos plant, whose root can be used to produce a wide variety of different dishes, as well as providing raw materials for clothing and other household essentials. The Polychrestos plant’s root grows underground and is harvested each autumn, and must not be disturbed at any other part of the year. Although this means that the size of the crop will only be revealed at harvest time, the climate on the island is extremely constant, and the island’s underground river distributes water evenly throughout the island’s soil... In order for each person to support herself, she must produce 200 kilos of root per year. A is a very hard-working, industrious type, whose agricultural efforts, from dawn to dusk each day, mean that she produces 700 kilos per annum, allowing her to eat very well and produce a wide range of leisure products. B, C and D are rather laid-back in their approach to agriculture, and work just five hours a day to produce the minimum 200 kilos a year. After a year of this, however, D, a rather unsavoury character, decides she does not want to work even five hours each day. Unknown to all the others, she diverts the underground river away from B and C’s sections of land, so that her land receives all of their water, boosting, she hopes, her own crop considerably. When harvest time comes, there are a number of surprises. A harvests her regulation 700 kilos. C’s land has had no water, and consequently she has no crop. She is destitute, despite her efforts over the past year. It also emerges that D (no water engineer) has in fact diverted the water away from her own land as well as that of C, and [therefore] B, far from having a failed crop, has been the beneficiary. To her surprise, she harvests 400 kilos. D is also destitute, and in rage and despair hangs herself with a rope fashioned from the last of the previous year’s Polychrestos crop. This leaves the problem of C. Without her year’s produce, C will die unless A and B provide her with the necessary 200 kilos. How should the remedial responsibilities be distributed?

Butt’s conclusion is that the BPP provides a strong reason to conclude that it is B, the beneficiary of D’s wrongdoing, who should meet C’s need for 200 kilos of polychrestos plant. I think that this conclusion is correct.

The remedial duty Butt and other BPP proponents identify is typically viewed as a secondary obligation, since it places compensatory duties upon beneficiaries only

if the primary duty-bearer—the wrongdoer—cannot be forced to pay the necessary remedial costs. Holding beneficiaries remediably responsible in cases of this kind seems intuitively fairer than requiring Victim, or society at large, to bear the costs of Perpetrator’s wrongdoing.

The BPP seems intuitive. However, it cannot easily explain why beneficiaries should relinquish their benefits in at least two classes of case: excess benefit cases and no compensable victim cases.

Excess benefit cases are cases in which the benefits generated by a wrong for Beneficiary exceed the remedial costs required to adequately compensate Victim. (Imagine that A steals B’s property, uses it to C’s great benefit, and then returns B’s property, leaving B only minimally worse off than she was before.) I will not examine excess benefit cases here, and utilitarians may find little to regret about their existence. No compensable victim cases, by contrast, are those in which the victims of wrongdoing cannot be adequately compensated. This could be for several reasons. First, it could be because victims are inaccessible. Consider

**Forced Labor**: Victim V is forced into slave labor under totalitarian regime T, generating 100 units of benefit (in the form of lower prices) for Consumer C, a foreigner who lives in a faraway and wealthy country. T does not allow foreigners access to its citizens, meaning that V cannot be compensated for the wrong done to her.

No compensable victim cases also include cases in which the relevant injustice killed victims and their families, leaving no one to be compensated. Consider

**Genocide**: A genocidal regime R wipes out an entire ethnic group E, melts down their belongings into gold ingots, and transfers the ingots to beneficiary group B.

In **Forced Labor** and **Genocide**, the BPP does not clearly provide a strong reason for obligating the beneficiaries of the wrong to disgorge their benefits, since victims cannot be compensated. This set of cases illuminates an important fact about the BPP: the principle holds that there is a positive duty to compensate victims of injustice adequately, not necessarily that there is a negative duty to avoid benefiting

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7. As Tom Parr writes, “With respect to corrective duties, the primary duty-bearer is the agent from whom the victim should first seek compensation.” Tom Parr, “The Moral Taintedness of Benefiting from Wrongdoing,” at 987.
from injustice.\textsuperscript{8} In excess benefit and no compensable victim cases, these duties come apart.

I take it that willingly retaining one’s benefits in Forced Labor and Genocide—say, using them to buy oneself a swimming pool or luxury car—would be wrong, and therefore that the BPP should be supplemented by another account in order to address the full set of benefit from wrongdoing cases.

Tom Parr has recently attempted to provide such an account. Parr thinks that beneficiary B’s decision to retain the benefits of injustice is wrong when a wrongdoer W intends that a beneficiary B benefit from his wrong. This is because it is morally bad if B allows W’s malicious plans to succeed. We should now examine Parr’s account in more detail.

\textbf{CURRENT THEORIES II: THE MORAL TAINTEDNESS ACCOUNT}

Parr agrees with Butt that beneficiaries of wrongdoing, whom he terms “recipients,” can bear obligations to disgorge their benefits. Parr thinks, however, that this obligation is not best justified by the BPP’s requirement that beneficiaries of wrongdoing provide victims with compensation. Parr thinks that a better justification for requiring beneficiaries of wrongdoing to disgorge their benefits is that benefits generated by wrongdoing are “morally tainted.”

On Parr’s account, a benefit is morally tainted when “the recipient’s possession of it is the \textit{intended result of injustice}” \textsuperscript{9} Moreover, “[t]he fact that a good is morally tainted generates an extra reason for the recipient to relin-

\textsuperscript{8} If Beneficiary’s benefits exceed the cost of Victim’s entitlement to compensation, the BPP allows Beneficiary to retain the excess. Tom Parr succinctly describes this aspect of the principle: “Recipient is liable either to compensate Victim adequately or to compensate Victim by an amount equal in value to the benefit received, whichever is the smaller...” \textsuperscript{[1]} It may be helpful to distinguish between the duty to mitigate the harmful effects of wrongdoing and the duty to avoid benefiting from wrongdoing. These duties diverge when the value of the benefit to Recipient is greater than the value of compensation that Victim can justly demand.” Parr, “The Moral Taintedness of Benefiting from Wrongdoing,” at 987. If, on the other hand, Beneficiary’s benefits are inadequate to compensate for Victim’s losses, the BPP does not require Beneficiary to give up resources in excess of those he derived from Victim’s loss. Robert Goodin and Christian Barry put the point this way: “the innocent beneficiary has no special responsibility for paying the victim’s costs over and above relinquishing in her favour the benefit he has received in consequence of the wrongdoing, and some other mechanism should be found for the victims to be compensated for the rest of their losses.” R. E. Goodin, and C. Barry, “Benefiting from the Wrongdoing of Others,” at 363.

\textsuperscript{9} Tom Parr, “Moral Taintedness,” at 994.
quis the good or the benefit it yields,” which is true “for both wrongdoers and other beneficiaries.”

Why might this be so? First, Parr thinks that if Recipient allows Wrongdoer to complete her immoral plans, Recipient does something bad for Wrongdoer: she “morally defiles her.” Second, Parr thinks that allowing immoral plans to be completed is “impersonally bad.” It is therefore “bad for a wrongdoer to complete her immoral plans,” and good if Recipient “frustrates the immoral plans of the wrongdoer.”

I agree with Parr that benefiting from wrongdoing is especially bad if it helps fulfill the evil plans of one or more wrongdoers. However, there are some cases of intuitively wrongful benefit from injustice that the moral taintedness theory would not identify as wrongful. As a result, the moral taintedness theory seems slightly too narrow to solve the Paradox of the Benefiting Samaritan. Consider

**Thwarted Trust:** Person A runs a network of corrupt, rights-violating mob organizations. After he retires, he places the profits of his wrongdoing in a trust for his beloved granddaughter, B, to be transferred upon A’s death. When A dies, however, things do not go according to plan. Instead, A’s equally corrupt lawyer, C, embezzles the funds intended for B and flees to Switzerland, where he buys himself a collection of vintage cars and a mountain chalet.

In embezzling the money intended for B, C has not fulfilled A’s evil plans. If anything, he has thwarted them. A would have been furious to find out about C’s embezzlement of the funds intended for his granddaughter. Yet it is not obvious why C is any more morally entitled to use the ill-gotten funds from the trust than B would have been, as Parr’s theory might seem to suggest. There are two reasons we should doubt that C is entitled to use the funds for his own benefit while B would not have been.

First, to hold otherwise would be to seriously weaken the real-world case against benefiting from injustice. Relatively few benefits of injustice flow from a wrongdoer’s intentional transfer of benefits to favored beneficiaries. Consider the case of the low prices Western consumers arguably face as a result of sweatshop labor. The manu-

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10. Tom Parr, at 994. Butt also expresses an argument in this direction; he believes that we have good reasons to ensure that wrongdoers do not achieve their unjust aims. “Being a moral agent,” argues Butt, “means being committed to the idea that justice should prevail over wrongdoing.” Daniel Butt, *Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution between Nations*, p. 128.

11. Tom Parr., at 994.

12. Ibid., at 994.

13. Ibid., at 994.
facturer’s intention (and possibly its legal duty) in such cases is to maximize its own profits and hence the return to shareholder value; reduced clothing prices for consumers are merely an incidental side effect of this goal. Benefits from wrongdoing can also flow to precisely the persons wrongdoers did not wish to benefit. Consider the debate over reparations for American slavery. Recent historical scholarship has revealed that Northern institutions, including major universities, derived significant benefits from the institution of Southern slavery—benefits that in some cases persist to this day. One can be fairly certain, however, that Southern slaveowners did not intend for the descendants of Northern military officers, against whom they fought more than four years of bloody war, to benefit from plantation slavery. Yet this fact alone does not seem to eliminate the moral case for reparations.

The second reason is one of principle. In Thwarted Trust, C actively and willfully planned to exploit the benefits of A’s mob operations, while B would have been a passive recipient of them had A’s plan succeeded. To the extent that beneficiaries’ intentions matter in assigning duties of compensation or disgorgement, the self-serving C should bear a heavier moral burden than the innocent B, not a lighter one.

Avia Pasternak has recently addressed this second point. She thinks that beneficiaries like C owe stronger compensatory duties than beneficiaries like B. Pasternak agrees with Parr that beneficiaries have a negative duty to avoid benefiting from the injustice, rather than only the BPP’s positive duty to compensate victims adequately. If an agent chooses to benefit from an injustice when she could have refrained from doing so, Pasternak argues that the agent owes a voluntary beneficiary penalty in addition to any compensation owed to victims of the relevant injustice.

This result seems correct. Furthermore, it can help address the intuitively wrongful cases of benefit from injustice, like Thwarted Trust, that the moral taintedness theory seems less easily able to identify as wrongful. As we shall see, however, Pasternak’s theory is slightly too broad to solve the Paradox. It forbids benefits from injustice that are intuitively non-wrongful, like those in News Media and Patriotic Film. We should turn to this issue now.

14. For a legal articulation of this principle, see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (1919) (holding that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders” and that “it is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefitting others.”).

15. See, for example, Slavery and Justice: Report of the Brown University Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice (2006).

CURRENT THEORIES III: THE VOLUNTARY BENEFICIARY PENALTY

Pasternak agrees that the BPP is a valid principle. However, she also thinks that beneficiaries of wrongdoing have a negative duty which prohibits them from benefiting: a duty “not to benefit from the suffering of others, or not to take advantage of wrongdoing at the expense of others.” As a result, she argues that “voluntary beneficiaries”—persons who actively choose to benefit from wrongdoing when they could have chosen not to—owe more in compensation than do innocent beneficiaries who benefit unwittingly or under duress.

Pasternak considers, for example, the case of a company C which knowingly contracts with an overseas factory F whose bosses violate the rights of their workers. This contract with the factory benefits the company by lowering its costs and raising its profits. Pasternak argues that if compensation must be paid for wrongs done to the workers and if F is unable to pay the full cost, then it is reasonable to compel C to pay “more in compensation to the workers than it gained from the deal with the factory.”

She concludes more generally that while involuntary beneficiaries need only disgorge their benefits to meet their moral obligations, the obligations of “voluntary beneficiaries to the victims of the wrongdoing could exceed the benefit they derived from the wrong.” The justification Pasternak gives for this conclusion is based on a negative duty not to benefit from injustice which is distinct from the BPP—which, as we have seen, does not obviously support such a negative duty in cases where the duty to compensate victims and the duty to avoid benefiting come apart. “The principle,” Pasternak contends, “rests on the core intuition that moral agents have a duty, to the victims of wrongdoing, not to benefit from the wrong done to them... In the case of [the factory], what grounds the duty to compensate the victims is the benefit, which acceptance constitutes a wrongdoing.”

Pasternak’s conclusion seems correct, but her justification for it—that agents have a duty not to benefit from injustice—looks slightly too broad to solve the Paradox. Goode, the news media, and the film director in Patriotic Film all benefit

17. Ibid., at 377.
18. Ibid., at 377.
19. Ibid., at 383.
20. Ibid., at 378.
21. Ibid., at 382.
from injustice voluntarily, in the sense that they could have avoided doing so. Goode could have taken a job at an insurance company or a telecoms firm; the news media executives could have worked for a university or school charity; the film director could have refused to sell tickets to his own film or insisted that they be given away for free. Yet it would be odd enough to demand that these agents relinquish a significant share of their benefits; it would be even odder to punish them by requiring that they pay an additional penalty on top of relinquishing their benefits.

My view is that voluntariness is necessary, but not sufficient, to render benefits from injustice wrongful. I think that Pasternak’s conclusion that voluntary beneficiaries owe more than innocent beneficiaries is best explained by reference to a use theory of unjust benefit, under which we act wrongly when we both a) voluntarily accept the benefits of injustice and b) intend to use the injustice primarily as a means to our own benefit. The use theory relies on the doctrine of double effect (DDE). Incorporating a use theory enables us to more satisfactorily solve the Paradox of the Benefiting Samaritan. Such a theory would be broader than the BPP, since it could require beneficiaries to disgorge actively sought-out benefits of injustice even when victims of that injustice cannot be compensated. It would also be broader than Parr’s moral taintedness theory, since it could identify an additional set of benefit cases as wrongful that the moral taintedness theory would not. It would be narrower, however, than Pasternak’s voluntary beneficiary penalty, since not all voluntary cases of benefit from injustice would be wrongful when evaluated against the use theory; only those cases in which we both act voluntarily and primarily aim to benefit ourselves would be wrongful.

In the remaining sections, I outline the two basic elements such a theory might contain, and explain why the theory’s conceptual underpinnings are familiar to political and moral philosophy.

THE USE PRINCIPLE

Here is a principle:

*Use Principle:* Voluntary beneficiaries’ duties not to use the benefits of injustice to their own advantage vary in proportion to the reasons which motivate, guide, or drive their decision to acquire those benefits.

The use principle in this form contains two important elements. First, it holds that an agent’s subjective intention in acquiring benefits from injustice can affect
whether her use of those benefits for her own advantage is morally permissible. This part of the principle relies heavily on the doctrine of double effect, or DDE. Second, the use principle holds that the wrong of acquiring benefits from injustice lies in their use for personal advantage, not in the original acquisition itself.

Let us examine the reasons element first. The reasons for which we benefit are distinct from the voluntariness with which we benefit. To see the difference, we should consider a new version of the Naylor-Goode debate with which this paper began. In the original film, Goode was a morally pure campaigner for justice whose primary goal was to take on the malicious tobacco industry. Here is a second possibility:

Goode 2: Following the live TV debate, a reporter locates Goode’s personal diary, inadvertently left backstage. Each entry excitedly chronicles the rising number of teenage tobacco deaths and celebrates the increasing donations to his nonprofit. “April 2nd: new report shows adolescent lung cancer deaths higher than anticipated. Here comes a raise and Cancun for spring break!... November 4th: new lawsuit filed by irritating rival campaign group against Philip Morris for lung cancer deaths. Have to hope Morris doesn’t go bankrupt so public remains frightened and donating to us. Note to self: present innocent face at TV debate Friday.”

Goode 2’s moral character is certainly inferior to that of Goode 1. But more importantly, is Goode 2 a beneficiary of injustice in exactly the same way that Goode 1 was, or in a different way? Should Goode 1 and Goode 2 be equally liable to compensate victims of the injustice from which they benefit? Imagine that the outward effects of Goode’s actions were precisely the same. (Note that Goode acts equally voluntarily in both cases.)

My intuition is that Goode 2 has acted wrongly while Goode 1 has not. The result is that Goode 2 bears moral duties of compensation or disgorgement while Goode 1 does not. (This, of course, does not settle what the absolute amount of compensation owed should be. If Goode 1 owes $0 in compensation, Goode 2 could owe anything from $0.01 to his full salary.) One possible way to explain this intuition is to appeal to the doctrine of double effect (DDE).

**INTENTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT**

Let us call the subset of Benefiting Samaritans who primarily aim at benefiting from injustice *Selfish Samaritans*. Let us call those who primarily aim at ameliorating injustice *Altruistic Samaritans*. If the doctrine of double effect has force in benefit from
injustice cases—as it seems to in at least some harming cases—Altruistic Samaritans may act permissibly while outwardly identical Selfish Samaritans do not.

According to proponents of the DDE, “it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend.” 22 While we may not use a Bad X as a deliberate means to bring about a Good Y, the DDE sometimes permits us to achieve Y while knowing that X will occur as a foreseen but unintended side effect of achieving Y.

A classic example is the case of the terror bomber and the tactical bomber. The terror bomber strikes a civilian area with the goal of killing 100 civilians, intending to use the resulting civilian terror to help win a war. Such an action would be intuitively impermissible. The tactical bomber, by contrast, strikes a military depot knowing that 100 nearby civilians will be killed as a foreseen side effect of his attack. Such an action is intuitively permissible (if we assume that a proportionality constraint is satisfied), despite the fact that the same number of civilians will be killed. 23

Another is the case of the doctor who administers morphine to a terminally ill patient, intending to accelerate the patient’s death. Such a doctor would act impermissibly. A doctor who administered the same dose of morphine with the intent to reduce the same patient’s pain, however, would act permissibly, despite knowing that the morphine would accelerate the patient’s death as a side effect. 24

Victor Tadros has given us a particularly interesting application of the DDE to cases of overdetermined harm. I paraphrase his set of cases here:

Overdetermination: C plans to harm A, causing 12 units of damage. The only way B can stop C from harming A is to harm A himself, causing only 7 units of damage, before C arrives in thirty seconds’ time. Seeking to minimize harm to the innocent A, B does in fact harm him, causing 7 units of damage. 25

In Overdetermination, B intuitively does not owe A compensation; B has, in fact, benefited A by preventing C’s imminent and even more harmful action. As Tadros observes, “if anyone owes A compensation in that case, it is C.” 26

Now consider

Overdetermination’: C plans to harm A, causing 12 units of damage. The only way

22. Philippa Foot, “The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect.”
23. Alison McIntyre, “Doctrine of Double Effect.”
24. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
B can stop C from harming A is to harm A himself, causing only 7 units of damage, before C arrives in thirty seconds’ time. B knows this but does not care about minimizing harm to A, his longtime nemesis. Instead, in a fit of vindictive rage, he wants to be the one who harms A, rather than allowing C to do it. B does in fact harm A, causing 7 units of damage, and departs, having gleefully accomplished his objective.²⁷

In Overdetermination’, it looks like B does owe A compensation, even though the external qualities of his action were identical to those in the first variation case in which B did not owe A anything. An obvious way to explain this fact is by reference to some form of the DDE under which what B intends, versus what B merely foresees, matters in determining whether he has acted wrongly, and therefore whether he owes A compensation.

Might the DDE’s application in benefit-from-injustice cases parallel its application in harm cases? Joseph Mangan articulates a classic version of the DDE:

“A person may licitly perform an action that he foresees will produce a good effect and a bad effect provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time:

1) that the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent;

2) that the good effect and not the evil effect be intended;

3) that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect;

4) that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.”²⁸

Let us call a morally bad benefit from wrongdoing B and a morally good amelioration of wrongdoing A.

The Altruistic Samaritan intends A and accepts B as a side effect. Mangan’s condition 1 is satisfied because A is morally good. Mangan’s condition 2 is satisfied because A is the goal intended. (The case is slightly different in Patriotic Film. There, the director did not aim at A, but neither did he aim at B. It may be that merely not aiming at the bad effect is sufficient to justify profiting in cases of this type.)

Whether Condition 3 is satisfied will depend upon the nature of the relation-

²⁷. Ibid.
ship between A, B, and the Altruistic Samaritan’s action. In *News Media*, for example, media executives’ decision to criticize the president’s unjust actions brought about both increased profits from injustice (morally bad) and citizens being exposed to criticism of an unjust figure (morally good or at least morally neutral). The criticism was not brought about by means of the morally bad increased profits, so it seems that condition 3 is satisfied.

Whether condition 4 is satisfied will depend again upon the particulars of the case. Perhaps principles of moral desert justify permitting Altruistic Samaritans who achieve a good outcome (criticism of tobacco companies or a bad president in *Goode* and *News Media*, or a valuable depiction of justified military heroics in *Patriotic Film*) to retain some or all of their benefits from injustice. Or perhaps economic incentives and the profit motive require states to structure markets in such a way that those who ameliorate injustice receive a high degree of compensation for doing so.

The situation is different with Selfish Samaritans. They fail Mangan’s test immediately at condition 2, since they intend the bad effect (personal profit from injustice) and not the good effect (amelioration of the injustice). As a result, the DDE can condemn their acts as wrong while permitting the otherwise identical acts of the Altruistic Samaritan.

Daniel Butt has applied a form of this insight to the case of microfinancial institutions which lend money to poor citizens of developing countries. By lending money to those who need it, microfinance institutions achieve a good. By charging interest, however, they themselves benefit from the loans they disburse, often to persons who are poor because of grave injustice done to them and their fellow citizens. If the profit becomes too high or the aid to the poor too minimal, the relationship between microfinance NGOs and the poor begins to look exploitative and at least *pro tanto* wrong.

Butt argues, however, that whether a relationship is exploitative does not depend only on objective facts like the profit margin of the microfinance NGO or the size of the benefit received by the poor borrower in the form of a microcredit loan. Butt thinks that the subjective intent of the microfinance NGO in making loans to the poor can itself determine whether the relationship is exploitative. “[I]t might be the case,” argues Butt, “that two microfinance institutions might offer identical terms to the same individuals, one of which counts as wrongfully exploitative, and one of which does not on account of the former’s seeking to gain advantage from injustice.”

30. Ibid., at 78. 
It is the seeking and not the advantage, on this theory, that creates a relationship of exploitation: “as soon as institutions seek to gain benefits from the situation of these individuals by extracting a surplus, they are guilty of wrongdoing.”

If the DDE is right, then it provides an underlying rationale for Butt’s claim here, and for Pasternak’s distinction between the moral obligations of voluntary and involuntary beneficiaries of injustice.

**USE AND PERSONAL ENRICHMENT**

We now move to the second element of the use principle: the idea that the wrong of acquiring benefits from injustice lies not in their acquisition but in their use for personal enrichment. Recall *Thwarted Trust*. There, the lawyer used the profits of exploitation to buy expensive luxury goods, which seemed intuitively wrongful. What could he have done to render his voluntary acquisition non-wrongful?

Advocates of the BPP will likely argue that he is obligated to return the profits to the victims of the injustice which generated the profits in the first place: those harmed by the deceased mob boss’s wrongdoing. That is one possible answer.

Parr thinks that a better solution is to distribute them to the victims of injustice generally, rather than the victims of the particular injustice which generated the benefits. Parr’s primary reason for rejecting the BPP lies in what he calls the fairness objection. According to Parr, the BPP licenses distributive unfairness among victims of wrongdoing. Parr illustrates the *fairness objection* with the following case:

*Double Embezzlement*: Wrongdoer embezzles equal funds from the bank accounts of Victim 1 and Victim 2 in order to transfer half of the combined embezzled funds into Recipient’s bank account. Unaware of the embezzlement, Recipient then purchases a ticket to the circus using these funds. Wrongdoer then disappears, after having spent the other half of the embezzled funds on fine wine that she consumes.

Parr asks us to imagine that “the funds transferred to Recipient are taken from Victim 1’s bank account only. The funds embezzled from Victim 2 were those that Wrongdoer spent on fine wine. A consequence of this is that Recipient benefits specifically from the injustice suffered by Victim 1, but not from the injustice suffered by Victim 2.” Parr argues that the connection theory would obligate Recipient to

31. Ibid.
33. Ibid., at 989.
grant lexical priority to Victim 1’s claim for compensation over the claim of Victim 2, from whose plight Recipient did not benefit—since “[a]fter all, whereas Recipient and Victim 1 now share a connection, Recipient and Victim 2 do not.”

This result, argues Parr, would be unfair. Specifically, it would be “unfair to Victim 2. It is unfair for Victim 2 to receive fewer entitlements than Victim 1 simply on the grounds that Victim 2 had the misfortune of being involved in a causal chain from which Recipient did not profit.”

Parr’s objection seems persuasive. Imagine that A suddenly finds herself in possession of benefits from an injustice that left its victims at welfare level 100. She has two choices: she can distribute the benefits to those victims, or she can donate them to the victims of a completely separate and even worse injustice that left its victims barely above subsistence level, at welfare level 5, but generated profits for no one. It would be strange if A were forbidden to donate her benefits to the victims of the more severe injustice, merely because they were unlucky enough to suffer from an injustice that generated profits for no one.

If Parr is correct, then our use of the benefits of injustice is not necessarily wrongful insofar as it is used to ameliorate injustice generally. Let us return to the lawyer in *Thwarted Trust* a final time. If the lawyer donated the boss’s trust fund to an anti-corruption nonprofit—or even to a completely unrelated but sufficiently good cause—he would not act wrongly merely because he voluntarily acquired additional benefits from injustice.

What would be a sufficiently good cause? What if the lawyer distributed the trust to a school charity that helped disadvantaged kids learn how to play musical instruments? What if his own children attended that same school and also benefited from the funds? What if he used the funds to start a business which provided high-wage jobs to many deserving job applicants in need of employment? These questions are difficult to answer. It seems sufficiently clear, however, that the lawyer acted wrongly insofar as he sought out the profits of injustice purely in order to use the benefits for his personal enjoyment. The use principle specifies that it is the use of the profits for personal satisfaction, rather than the initial voluntary acquisition of them, that is morally troubling.

One final methodological note: I admit that in some of the cases I have described, several moral wrongs exist that are separate and distinct from the use of unjust ben-

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34. Ibid., at 989.
35. Ibid., at 989.
benefits for one’s own advantage. In *Thwarted Trust*, for instance, the lawyer embezzled funds that did not belong to him. He both a) stole and b) aimed to use the benefits of injustice for purposes of personal enrichment. The presence of several wrongs in a single act can complicate the moral picture.

I do not think, however, that aiming to benefit from injustice is reducible purely to other moral wrongs that might accompany the benefit. Imagine that the lawyer in *Thwarted Trust* had instead voluntarily entered a lottery, the winner of which would receive all of the mob boss’s ill-gotten gains. The lawyer passionately hoped to win and purchased as many lottery tickets as allowed him under the rules. Were he to win, the use theory would still condemn his use of the ill-gotten gains for personal enrichment, as in the original case. That result seems intuitive, and accords with the core principles of the use theory. Aiming to use injustice for our benefit is merely one of many wrongs that agents can perform in relation to the fruits of injustice. Yet it is a distinct wrong nonetheless.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that some version of the use principle can provide a plausible answer to the Paradox of the Benefiting Samaritan. The use principle holds that voluntarily acquired benefits from injustice are wrongful to the extent that an agent intends to use them primarily for the purpose of personal enrichment.

I did not, however, mean to suggest that alternative theories regarding benefits from injustice are incorrect. Consider, for instance, the BPP. If victims of an injustice require compensation, I agree that we may violate a positive duty to compensate them insofar as we possess the benefits of the injustice that harmed them, regardless of whether we sought those duties out for the purpose of personal enrichment. The use principle is not intended to contradict that position. Instead, it is intended to supplement those theories which establish a negative duty not to benefit from wrongdoing, regardless of the need of victims for compensation and our ability to compensate them.

The use principle, as a result, provides a targeted solution to the Paradox of the Benefiting Samaritan that neither forbids intuitively permissible benefits like those in *News Media* nor permits intuitively wrongful benefits like those in *Thwarted Trust*. In that sense, the goal of this paper was simply to map out a possible theoretical basis—
one familiar to us from other areas of political and moral philosophy—for rendering our competing intuitions about Paradox cases internally coherent.
REFERENCES


